The Lebanese-Israeli Negotiations: Where To?

After the seventh round of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in Rome under the sponsorship of the United States, and before any date has been announced for the eighth round, which is said to be possible early next month, a delay that itself shows the scale of the real challenges and obstacles Israel is placing on the negotiating table, the following observations can be made. Israel continues its policy of "negotiating by fire" on the ground, which aims to create a new reality in order to impose its conditions and priorities on the "negotiation around the table". The Israeli military escalation bears witness to this, in its geography (it has reached the western Bekaa) and in its force and intensity of fire. It is an escalation that has not stopped; it now accompanies the negotiations. This does not mean, of course, that Israel is able in the end to impose its priorities and its approach to the negotiating track. But it threatens that track seriously and dangerously.

It must be recalled that negotiation is not an end in itself. It is a diplomatic and realistic means, however many challenges and difficulties stand in its way, of stopping the aggression, liberating the national territory in full, and ending the war.

Israel's negotiating strategy rests on a policy of bulldozing the land, setting fire to woodland and farmland, and systematically destroying villages and residential areas, so that it becomes hard for life to return to them even if Israeli military action were to stop tomorrow; and tomorrow, under this policy, is decided by Israel. It is worth noting that Israel is working to consolidate what is called the security belt, or the safe zone, on Lebanese territory, under its total control and within an open time frame that it alone decides, as its officials say every day.

Israel's strategy at the "diplomatic table" appears aimed at running down the clock, within a logic of negotiating for the sake of negotiating. Israel shows a readiness to take up some headings while staying away from the substance of subjects that are more than fundamental to the negotiations, such as the border (Lebanon insists on confirming, not demarcating, the border, as we always recall, since our southern border is internationally recognised: it is the Lebanese-Palestinian border drawn in 1923).

The logic of negotiating for the sake of negotiating around the table, which represents Israel's actual approach to the talks, is a defining trait of the Israeli negotiator. It is sharpened by the political escalation that accompanies the escalation on the ground as the parliamentary elections at the end of next October approach. Netanyahu, his allies and his opponents are all fighting their electoral political wars in three "theatres": Gaza, the West Bank and south Lebanon. In this context it must be recalled that President Joseph Aoun, in his speech at the dinner of the Lebanese embassy in Washington on 22 July, set out an approach to "the question of arms" based on realism, gradualism and comprehensiveness, taking into account experiences similar to the Lebanese case (the Irish Republican Army and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia): an approach that amounts to a road map for carrying out the decision on the exclusivity of arms in the hands of the Lebanese state and, of course, the decision of war and peace. He said that this approach does not make the goal less urgent; it makes the method more important. It is the method that strongly helps the state to return to its natural and full role in everything that concerns national security, over the whole of Lebanese territory.

What is needed today to save the negotiations from slowing, stalling or possibly failing, as each party describes it from its own position or view, is real support in all its forms from the influential international and regional parties, and first among them, without doubt and in particular, the American party, which is the sponsor and architect of the negotiations. This support should take the form of a real push to achieve the Lebanese demands that are more than fundamental to an active and effective negotiating track. They are: consolidating the ceasefire, rather than negotiating under Israeli fire; stopping the systematic destruction and bulldozing that aims to change the situation in the south entirely on the day after the Israeli war ends, whenever it ends; and setting a clear timetable for withdrawal and for the deployment and full control of the Lebanese army over the area stretching from south of the Litani to Lebanon's international border, with that border confirmed, as we have said, and the Armistice Agreement activated, and developed if need be.

Lebanon's stability, through ending the Israeli occupation on the "southern front" and extending the full control of the Lebanese state over its territory, is more than necessary for launching the path of the "return to the state": the more than necessary condition for a comprehensive national development whose dimensions are many and interlinked. It is also necessary as a contribution to the stability of a Middle East region that is living through upheavals, conflicts and wars, in many forms and under many banners, each affecting the others in different ways and degrees.