Essential Elements of an Effective Foreign Policy for Lebanon

In the midst of the regional and domestic developments and challenges facing Lebanon, and on the basis of the experience and lessons of the recent and the more distant past, there are a number of elements whose presence is more than necessary for shaping an effective, active foreign policy for Lebanon, one that takes the initiative.

First: we must remember that the political geography of any state governs, or greatly affects, its national security, and therefore what its priorities ought to be in its foreign relations and foreign policy.

Second: the importance of a real national consensus, not a "folkloric" one, on the priorities that organise and govern foreign policy. Political and doctrinal affiliations, including identity affiliations of the sub-state or trans-state kind, must not govern or control what ought to be a broad national consensus on the great issues, expressed by the state: the state of institutions, as against the federation of political sectarianisms in Lebanon that share out power and control it in a game of "musical chairs", exchanging roles and positions, even under different banners and slogans: from the "Hanoi" of the revolution, whose doctrinal banner has changed over time, to the "Switzerland of the East" that has nothing to do with its surroundings. Let us remember that what is needed is a broad and real national consensus, one that works to strengthen the logic of the state, which reflects and reinforces the concept of Lebanon's national security.

Third: all of this makes it possible to work out the practical rules and understandings (a consensus on substance, not on headings), and also the priorities and the vision, of an effective foreign policy. And as a reminder: there is no successful, effective diplomacy that does not rest on Lebanon's vision of its foreign relations, its priorities and its role, first in the Arab framework and also at the regional and international levels; otherwise we are like someone who talks of playing music without instruments. And of course, among the foremost measures of a state's actual authority is its total possession of the decision of war and peace.

Fourth: the lessons of the recent and distant past, and the growing, intertwined and overlapping challenges in our immediate surroundings, in their elements, causes and solutions, which greatly affect Lebanese national security, all call for a foreign policy that rests in practice, and not only at the level of discourse, on the concept of active positive neutrality. As a reminder, this concept has nothing to do with legal neutrality on the model of Swiss neutrality, for example. Lebanon is an Arab state, and I do not say an Arabist one, a founding member of the League of Arab States, and must of course abide by the Arab constants, especially in the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict, even if those constants weaken or waver at a given moment. That in no way means that Lebanon should bear the burden of this conflict alone and on behalf of others. Working out the required constants and understandings, and the return of the state's role in fact and not in form, would mean that Lebanon no longer remains a chess piece, or a mailbox for the exchange of messages, in regional conflicts, whatever the banners of those conflicts, their appeal, or Lebanon's position on them or within them.

Fifth: among the things Lebanon has a definite interest in helping to shape, so as to organise relations in practice in the Middle East region and among its states: strengthening the principle of non-interference in the affairs of others; not speaking over the heads of states in the name of doctrinal, political or other positions; and genuine respect for, and reinforcement of, the internationally recognised political rules for settling disputes between states, and acting in accordance with them, within the logic of the state and not within an ideological logic of the "above the state" kind. We need to work on developing these concepts and rules in order to found policies of this kind, to which all the political components in Lebanon commit themselves, and which are in the end in the interest of all of them, under the roof of the state, even if one party or another benefits from the weakness or absence of the concept of the state at a given moment. Making the authority of the state and the logic of the state the arbiter in the making and conduct of our foreign relations remains more than necessary for preserving and strengthening Lebanon's national security.

Sixth: because Lebanon is the state most affected by regional developments and tensions, as we have said, by reason of geography and of the make-up of its society, we have a definite national interest, in protecting, safeguarding and strengthening national security, in Lebanon playing the role of firefighter in the region, sometimes even pre-emptively, if the conditions I have mentioned are met (real national understandings), which are more than necessary, and when the need arises. The experience of other states offers a model here, the Sultanate of Oman for one. This role strengthens the national security of the state and helps to save Lebanon from remaining a captive of the "game of nations", even if the players and the banners of the game change.

Seventh: I began with official diplomacy, and I would like to end by stressing the importance of public diplomacy in its many forms, economic, cultural, political and other, which completes and strengthens official diplomacy: a diplomacy that builds bridges of understanding and cooperation and reinforces existing ones. The soft power Lebanon possesses, its openness, its level of education, its freedoms, its cultural and political diversity, its experience and its diaspora, makes successful public diplomacy possible: the diplomacy that serves and advances the national interest in our contemporary world, that at times prepares the way for official diplomacy in many new fields, and that also works in parallel with it, ahead of it, or sometimes after it. In this context I have proposed in the past, and I repeat today, the importance of networking in the diaspora: building geographic, functional or specialist networks that bring together emigrants of different generations, specialisations and positions, and that work as a continuous "lobby" for building lines of contact in various fields, and strengthening existing bridges, between Lebanon and the countries to which the diaspora belongs, in the interest of Lebanon, the mother country, and of those countries.

This column is based on the lecture I gave at the conference on "Which foreign policy for Lebanon?", organised by the Fouad Chehab Foundation in cooperation with the Institute of Political Science and the Philip Salem Centre for Political Studies at Saint Joseph University of Beirut, on 9 April 2025.